This paper focuses on alternative money's worth measures of the Italian (public) pension system for representative cohorts, considering both the present transition and the future steady state envisaged by recent reforms. Micro-based calculations of the aggregate budget effects induced by further possible policy changes are also presented. The main results of the simulation exercise are: i. young and future generations face a steady and strong reduction of their social security's worth mainly due to the 1992 and 1995 reforms and accentuated the discontinuities characterising the reforms; ii. throughout most of the transition period, the increase in benefits for an additional year of work, after reaching seniority pension requirements, does not offset the financial costs generated by additional contributions and shorter expected retirement. The implied loss still represents a strong incentive to early retirement; iii. the extension, from the year 2000, of the pro rata mechanism to all new pensioners would generate a non-negligible smoothing effect on microeconomic distortions, but a comparatively small reduction in pension expenditure; iv. a much larger reduction can be obtained if seniority pensions are determined according to actuarial fairness: i.e., by taking into account life expectancy at retirement; v) considering the introduction of an opting out clause, all generations hit by recent reforms have an incentive to quit; the younger the cohort, the stronger the incentive. The paper finally highlights aspects of the social security problem which deserve to be addressed in a more complete analysis, such as risk adjustments, welfare implications and general equilibrium feedback effects. Even without these extensions, we think our conclusions are quite robust, and may help policy discussion.
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Aims and motivations
The reform of a social security system cannot be reduced to a mere technical problem. It triggers consent and dissent, polemic and emotion -often voiced in over-heated tones. It modifies expectations and disappoints hopes. 'Social security' represents, in other words, an unsolved and increasingly sensitive conundrum for a country like Italy and, in general, for all 'mature' societies.
In Italy, the Nineties have marked a period of intense, although incomplete, reform (Brugiavini, Fornero 1999) . Despite the 1992 (Amato) and 1995 (Dini) reforms, imbalances in the pension system will continue to be high for the next 3-4 decades (3,5 -4,5 per cent of GDP).
These imbalances contribute to overall public deficit, thereby diverting resources from alternative uses, through which it could be possible to boost the efficiency and also, arguably, the equity of public spending. They also affect intergenerational distribution, directly or indirectly depriving young people of resources. Aggregate concerns, however, are not the sole ones. In fact, pension determination rules distort labour market incentives, causing the exit of workers at among the lowest ages anywhere in the world and, for the double convenience of employees and employers, favour the expansion of black activities 1 .
An issue so dense in political, social and generational implications deserves to be addressed in a detached way, deprived of the ideological elements that have so far characterised the political debate. This paper aims at providing a rigorous calculation base for alternative reform paths, including partial privatisation.
Of course, economic calculations are hardly totally value-free, and ours are no exception. We present and discuss in some detail the simulation model and the sensitivity analysis, but also the main shortcomings of the exercise, due to the lack of uncertainty and feedback effects in the model. Within this perspective, the paper has two aims: i. to describe the transition in progress in the public pension system, and the (slow) convergence towards the new contribution-based formula introduced, for the long run regime, by the 1995 reform. The description is quantitative and mainly adopts a 'generational accounting' framework, albeit limited to the social security component. It considers the generations affected by the transition and those of the future regime, and presents measures designed to capture, in different scenarios, the implicit money's worth of participation in the system 2 ;
ii. to estimate the effects of some reform proposals: in particular, the extension of the pro rata mechanism to cohorts excluded in 1995 3 and the introduction of an actuarially fair correction for the new flows of "seniority" pensions 4 . Both these measures would produce three main effects: a reduction in the present distortions favouring early retirement; a smoothing of the disparity of treatment of contiguous cohorts caused by the adoption, by the 1995 reform, of rigid lines of demarcation; a cut in expenditure, and thereby a correction of the system's financial imbalance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and compares different money's worth measures of participation in the public PAYG system. Section 3 describes the simulation model and its parameterisation. Section 4 sums up the main results, with reference to a particular scenario, for the transition period and the steady state (which, under our hypotheses, will be reached, for the flow of new pensions, around 2035). Section 5 shows the effects of the extension of the pro rata mechanism, distinguishing between microeconomic and aggregate effects. Section 6 presents some sensitivity analysis with respect to variations in the macroeconomic scenario. Section 7 discusses the limits of the simulation exercise. Section 8 is a very preliminary analysis of the opting out problem in Italy. Section 9 presents our conclusions. The tables referred to in the analysis of the results are contained in appendix A, while appendix B provides a detailed description of the simulation model and the sources of the data used for the calculation.
Social Security money's worth measures
In the following analysis, we assess social security money's worth for different cohorts and different retirement ages by adopting three indicators:
i. the ratio between the present values of benefits and of contributions (net present value ratio, or NPVR);
ii. the internal rate of return on contribution (IRR);
iii. the ratio between first pension and last wage (replacement ratio, or RR).
As the tables 1-7 show, all three indicators (which, as ratios, have the advantage of being independent from the unit of measurement 5 ) offer the same trend pointers, which thus may be considered as robust. More specifically, the figures unequivocally demonstrate how -as an effect of the transition in progress and especially the passage from an earningbased formula to a contribution-based one -the value of social security for the different age groups is bound to decrease considerably over the next few decades.
Moving on to a comparison of the different indicators, the first two stem directly from financial choice criteria and thus stress the financial/insurance nature of the PAYG public system with respect to its redistributive character. They consequently possess all the advantages, but also all the limits, resulting from deterministic exercises that overlook not only the uncertainty but also the various imperfections of the market. It is worth recalling, however, that it is precisely market failures (such as adverse selection or the presence of liquidity constraints on subjects endowed solely or prevalently with human capital) which justify the very existence of public systems 6 . From a more technical point of view, given compulsory participation in the public system, the IRR is not subject to the usual objections about the reinvestment of flows, and, 4 Seniority pensions are awarded when a given working seniority has been reached, irrespective of age (which can be as low as 55, and formerly even less).
compared with the rate of return of alternative assets available on the market, measures the opportunity cost resulting from this participation.
The NPVR, on its part, is valued at the beginning of the individual's working life and measures the amount which -calculated in present value at the same date -is returned by the system for every "euro invested", taking into account the opportunity cost associated with a lost alternative, measured by the exogenously fixed interest rate.
Finally, the replacement ratio represents a spurious measure of money's worth of social security, since it crucially depends on the last part of the age earning profile and on the way pensions are indexed to the cost of living and real wages 7 . In our simulation, however, the redistributive effects associated with diverging trends in income profiles are neutralised, since, by hypothesis, the earning profiles of all generations have the same form, and differ only due to a scale-effect resulting from productivity growth. Likewise, we assume no indexation to real wages, but full indexation to prices, for all cohorts. This means that while, from the point of view of the individual, RR supplies an ambiguous measure of money's worth, it still conveys significant comparisons between cohorts.
The simulation model and its parameterisation (microeconomic aspects)
In this section, we confine ourselves to an informal exposition of the model (see the appendix for a full description of the software). First, we only consider private employees, not the self employed and the public employees. Each generation is identified by a representative agent, who begins to work at the age of 22, has an uninterrupted working career and a wage profile equal to τ , t w , where t is the calendar year and τ the age, and retires after 35-40 years' service, with a pension P constant in real terms throughout the retirement period.
Focussing on intergenerational comparisons, we overlook the effects of redistribution within each cohort, which is still present due to the residual heterogeneity of the rules applied to different worker categories. The wage profile has been estimated from a cross section (1996) distribution of average wages obtained from INPS (the Italian Public Pension Agency), and adjusted for inflation. The curves relative to each generation are obtained by taking into account the rate of growth of real wages (historical data until 1997 and constant rates, but variable from scenario to scenario, for subsequent periods). This means that a typical individual has an annual wage increase equal to the sum of the sectional increase in productivity (g), the longitudinal increase (a) due to longer service, and the composition effect of the former two rates 8 . The simulation was performed considering different macroeconomic scenarios; in all cases, however, the interest rate was assumed higher than the GDP growth rate, even though the difference between the two (both known with certainty) is always rather low and fails to exceed one percentage point. The parameters were thus chosen so as not to 'exaggerate' the dominance of funding over PAYG. 
Figure 3.1 -Life cycle profiles of a representative worker (cohort 1942)
Transition
≥ 15 years' seniority: gradual transition from the average wage of the last 5 years to the average of the last 10 (one every two years); <15 years' seniority: pro rata: for seniority matured subsequent to 1992 the average refers to 5 + t years (t = number of years since reform)
Long run provisions Average wage of the whole working life (after correcting each yearly wage by a real increase of 1%) Dini Reform (1995) Transition ≥ 18 years' seniority (the 15 fixed by the Amato reform + the three between the two reforms): like in the Amato transition with seniority over or equal to 15 years; with acceleration of the passage to the average of 10 wages, according, for the years subsequent to 1995, to an increase of 1 year every 1.5 years; <18 years' seniority: pro rata (for seniority matured before 1995, the formula is that of the Amato transition with fewer than 15 years' seniority)
Long run provisions Contribution based formula 10 :
Main results
The tables in the appendix present the main results of the simulation exercise. The comments which follow refer to tables 1, 2 and 3. With reference to a particular set of parameters and two normative scenarios (status quo on the left and extension of pro rata mechanism from 2000 on the right), the tables describe the three different measures for the generations between 1942 and 1988 (that will retire in the time period from 2000 to 2051).
For the years up to 1997, the macroeconomic environment is defined by the historical growth rates of wages 11 and, for subsequent years, by a constant rate of growth of productivity (g), equal to 1.5 per cent. The rate of interest (r) used to calculate the present value of contributions and benefits is the same for all cohorts and is set at 2 per cent 12 . show the values corresponding to the same generation, characterised by different seniority at retirement (from 35 to 40 years). Given the complexity of the interaction between age and length of service in determining the result, it is perhaps useful to separate the comments by column (different cohorts, but constant seniority) from those by line (same cohort with increasing seniority).
Reading by column, we see a progressive, continuous reduction of money's worth from the oldest cohorts to the youngest up to the attainment of a steady state (coinciding with the retirement of the first cohort that worked entirely within the Dini long run provision -i.e., who began activity on January 1 1996). In this scenario, the steady state NPVR is only slightly higher than half that of the first generation considered; in the hypothesis of retirement with 35 years' seniority (first column), the ratio is 0.57. Still considering a seniority of 35 years (and retirement at 57), participation in the public system begins to generate a 'loss' (NPVR lower than one) from the 1967 cohort 13 . 10 Where: a = payroll tax rate, x = retirement age, W j = wages in year j, N = seniority at retirement, t = years until retirement, g = GDP growth rate, c x = transformation coefficient set by law (actuarially fair at 1.5%).
11 Processing of various sources (cf. table 2, appendix B). 12 For the discussion on the variation of the macroeconomic framework and the difference between r and g, which is of crucial importance for all the results, see Section 6. 13 The small differences in the steady state figures in rows are due to approximation.
The reasons for this trend reflect a mix of historical conditions and hypotheses for the future (in particular, with regard to rates r and g). More generally, the table shows the intrinsic redistributive nature of the PAYG system among generations and, more specifically, the fact that the institution of the system and every subsequent improvement entailing net benefits in favour of the generation concerned necessarily imply a lower NPVR subsequent for cohorts and, in any case, for the steady state generations. In this sense, all generations prior to that of 1967 still benefit from 'gifts' from the favourable legislation of the past, whereas for those under long run provisions the result derives directly from the spread of rate r over the PAYG implicit rate of return g.
Reading by line, we see an inverse correlation between the NPVR and retirement age. This correlation, which implies gradually decreasing returns from social security with the prolongation of the working life over 35 years of seniority, is due to the earning-based component of the pension, and becomes all the more significant the higher the weight of this component.
In order to correctly evaluate the disincentive to the continuation of work generated by the earning-based portion of the pension, it is necessary to estimate the variation in pension wealth of an individual who, having reached the minimum pension requirements, decides to continue to work for one or more years. This estimate is shown in figure 6 in appendix A, which presents the percentage reduction of social security wealth due to the lengthening of seniority from 35 to 40 years for the cohorts from 1942 to 1988. The figure reveals an especially sharp reduction (around 18 per cent) for the oldest cohorts, whose pension is determined exclusively using the earning based formula. For the other cohorts too, however, the "taxation" of pension wealth is far from negligible 14 . The disincentive obviously drops as the contribution-based component grows progressively in the pension calculation; it may be traced to the poor link between contributions and benefits typical of the defined benefit formula, which incorporates no actuarial correction for different life expectancy at retirement. 14 A slight 'taxation' (less than 2%) still remains on the cohorts whose pension is totally defined contribution. This is essentially due to assumptions used in the simulation exercise. In particular, the reform's conversion coefficients contain actuarial hypotheses that are slightly different from those used in the model (for example, the coefficients envisaged by law consider average mortality for males and females, whereas in the model the typical pensioner is male).
Turning to the internal rate of return (table 2), similar considerations apply. The trend by column of this parameter shows a strong decrease: from values around 3.5 per cent for cohorts close to retirement it converges to the value of 1.5 per cent characteristic of the steady state, this being the hypothesis for the growth of productivity (and 1.5 per cent being the rate used in the coefficient which transforms into an annuity the capitalised value of contributions).
Finally, as far as the replacement ratio is concerned (table 3) For individuals who began to work in 1972, and are hence excluded from the application of the contributory method, the pension is independent of the retirement age, 15 The positive correlation between RR and seniority is due to the divergence between the increase in wages and that in the pension following an additional year's work. The first is low, as compared to the second. The last reflects, for the earning based part, the average of wage growth rates and the addition of 2% of the average wage due to the additional year of seniority; and, for the contribution based part, the higher contributions paid, the longer period of capitalisation and the higher conversion coefficient due to the increase in age. 16 Calculated at retirement age, as the present value of future benefits, taking account of survivors' pension. hence constant; on the contrary, the pension wealth of the individual who retires at 57 years of age exceeds that of the individual who retires at 65 years of age by about 21 per cent.
For careers commenced in 1982, hence subject to pro rata, with an incidence of the contributory component of 22 years, the disparity in social security wealth is notably reduced, since, wage profiles being equal, the pension adjusts (in the quota calculated with the contributory method) to life expectancy after retirement.
5. The effects of introducing actuarial fairness in the transition: extending the pro rata mechanism and cutting seniority pensions.
• The correction of present distortions. The option of reform considered herewhose microeconomic effects are shown in the right-hand side of tables 1, 2 and 3 in the appendix -consists of extending the new contributory rules to all the active cohorts for the remaining working life. As is well known, by preferring (perhaps out of necessity!) the political calculation to the actuarial calculation, the 1995 reform left unscathed those who, at December 31 1995, had 18 and more years of seniority, thus deferring far in the future the full phasing in of the new rules. With the extension of pro rata mechanism, instead, new pensions fall partly into the earning based method and partly into the contribution based method according to the number of years worked under the two different pension formulae.
The introduction of pro rata to seniority matured from 2000 for people with 18 years' seniority or more in 1995 would allow, first and foremost, to eliminate the disparity of treatment between contiguous cohorts, highlighted by the "jump" in figure 1. A strong disparity exists whereby, due to the preservation of the old earning based method, workers born before 1956 (in the hypotheses of entry onto the labour market outlined above) conserve a hefty advantage with respect to workers born afterwards. The dotted line clearly shows the equitable effects that would be produced with the application of the pro rata mechanism.
In terms of the indicators considered thus far, the extension of pro rata basically entails two effects: on the one hand, it reduces the money's worth of the PAYG system for all cohorts involved and for all retirement ages; on the other, it reduces the advantage of early retirement. The reason for this reduction is that, given the rather flat wage profile, each lira of marginal contribution has little influence on the earning related component of the pension 17 , whereas it is capitalised in the contribution related component, which also benefits from the higher conversion coefficient. Obviously, this effect is stronger, the higher the weight of the last component, that is, the younger the cohorts.
The reduction of the disincentive to postpone retirement is highlighted once more in figure 6 ; as can be seen, the introduction of pro rata would not appear to be crucial; however, for cohorts subsequent to 1944, it reduces the distortion by a non-negligible magnitude.
The extension of pro rata also helps to contain actuarial unfairness: as table 9 illustrates, a comparison of part b of the table to the corresponding section of part a shows lower differences between the pension wealth of seniority pensioners and that of 65-yearolds.
• Containing expenditure. The effects of the extension of the pro rata mechanism are not only microeconomic; indeed, in the political debate, the prevailing motivation is the aggregate reduction of pension expenditure.
Any estimate of this effect on suitable microeconomic bases entails a certain degree of difficulty, first because of the heterogeneity of insurance positions which the existing legislation still originates, and second, because of the lack of data about their actual number. . It must be recalled, however, that the simulation only considers the FPLD fund, excluding public employees and self-employed workers. In all likelihood, the inclusion of these categories would generate a non-negligible further reduction in expenditure. On the whole the simulation confirms that, if seniority pension legislation remains unchanged, the extension of the pro rata mechanism will not suffice to achieve a significant reduction in pension expenditure and deficits.
An actuarial correction of seniority pensions appears much more effective from the financial point of view. To estimate the reduction in expenditure resulting from a policy intervention of this type, we have calculated the correction of the earning related quota of all pensions on the basis of retirement age, adopting as a correction coefficient the ratio between Dini's transformation coefficient for the age considered and that for 65 years 22 .
Considering the distribution by age and seniority of the FPLD workers (about 11 millions workers), we have estimated future pension flows for three cases:
19 Variable, however, from one simulation to the other, within the range 75 to 83. 20 It is worth noting that a prolongation of life generates higher cuts, since the alternative is not between paying and not paying, but between paying with or without pro rata. Moreover, in the estimates we fail to take survivors' pensions into account. Nonetheless, the different simulations performed by varying the duration of life offer a rough indication of their effect. 21 In terms of percentage of GDP, the estimates are in line with those obtained in other studies (Cf. Brambilla and Leoni, 1998) , though lower than those recently obtained by INPS (cf. INPS, 1999) . The reasons reside probably in different assumptions about mortality rates and wage profiles. 22 Cf. Gronchi 1997. For ages lower than 57, the 57 coefficient was applied. The policy measure we simulated only applies to newly liquidated pensions. However, one could also consider, perhaps for the sake of fairness, a "solidarity contribution" on the part of those pensioners who already enjoy a seniority pension, subject to a given income floor. a) existing legislation b) actuarial correction of earning related quotas c) extension of the pro rata mechanism plus actuarial correction of earning related quotas.
It can be seen (table 10 in the appendix) that the reduction in expenditure is much higher than that corresponding to the extension of the pro rata alone; more specifically, the annual "savings" flow reaches a maximum of about 0.7 per cent of the GDP in around 2022. It is interesting to note how the joint application of actuarial correction and pro rata mechanism fails to generate a saving higher than that of the correction of seniority pensions alone 23 .
A last point concerns the social acceptability of the reform hypotheses outlined above. Whereas the extension of pro rata does not affect rights acquired at a certain date, since it establishes that the new norms will apply to all only for the future, the actuarial correction of the earning related component affects rights already matured and would thus be a rather hard measure to push through.
Result-sensitivity to changes in parameters
The simulations of tables 1-3 in the appendix are represented in tables 4-7 with reference to a different set of macroeconomic parameters. In particular, in tables 4 and 6 the interest rate has been raised to 3 per cent, and the growth in GDP (and real wages) to 2.5 per cent, for periods subsequent to 1997. In this way, though levels vary, the differential between interest rate and growth rate has been kept constant (0.5 percentage points).
From the qualitative point of view, comments on the benchmark case (r=2% and g=1,5%) are all the more valid for this new scenario; nonetheless, the tables highlight a problematic aspect of the fully phased 1995 reform. In fact, starting from the 1956 cohort (instead of the 1967 one), the NPVR is lower than 100 per cent for all retirement ages, whereas the steady state value is about 76 per cent (10 percentage points lower than in the benchmark case). The steady state internal rate of return, finally, settles at around 2 per cent. The reasons for this NPVR trend reside in the difference between the internal rate of return of the PAYG system and the assumed interest rate. Due to the weak link between contributions and benefits that continues in the transition, the internal rate of return of the system is not an immediate consequence of the growth rate of the economy; for the oldest cohorts, the (positive) differential between the IRR, which does not undergo sizeable variations in the two scenarios, and the interest rate is lower than in the benchmark case, implying a decrease in net benefits.
For the younger cohorts, it is also necessary to note that the link between IRR and GDP growth rate is not complete even in the contributory system. In fact, the transformation coefficient of the notionally accrued contributions into pension is fixed by law (and reviewed every ten years). A discount rate is implicit in the coefficient. If this discount rate is different from the rate of return recognised on contributions (equal to the GDP growth rate), the IRR is an average of the two. In the benchmark case, the problem did not rise since, as we have pointed out, the GDP growth rate (1.5 per cent) was equal to the rate implicit in the transformation coefficients of the 1995 reform; if the scenario varies, this is no longer true. For the steady state cohorts, the IRR is about two per cent, i.e. one per cent lower than the assumed interest rate, implying a decrease in net benefit. Tables 5 and 7 consider a scenario characterised by a growth in GDP of 2.5 per cent and an interest rate of 3.5 per cent; the increase in the interest rate heightens the reduction in net benefits for the older cohorts, while the increase in the differential between the interest rate and the growth rate produces a further reduction for steady state cohorts. In fact, with respect to the situation suggested by tables 4 and 6, since there is no variation in g, IRR is unvaried for these cohorts, but the interest rate has increased by 0.5 percentage points.
One final consideration concerns the significance of simulations with different macroeconomic parameters: due to the ten year review of coefficients, the suggested reduction in net benefits has to be viewed with some caution. In fact, if we adopt a GDP growth rate different from the one implicit in the coefficients, the transformation in the first case, and only by pro rata in the second. Since the contributory method is actuarially fair, the two coefficient ought to be reviewed more than once in the course of the period simulated 24 . This would unquestionably reduce the effects of variations in the macroeconomic framework on benefits and the internal rate of return.
Limits of the simulation exercise
As we have already stressed, the calculations presented here have to be interpreted with some caution. Even greater caution is required when it comes to drawing certain implications for social security policy. More specifically, uncertainty, liquidity constraints and the redistributive function (in favour of the weakest, least fortunate workers) are totally lacking from the model. As we have argued elsewhere (Fornero 1999) , it is precisely these market limits which call for public intervention, and so, perhaps, a PAYG (or, more generally, a not actuarially fair) component in the pension system. Economic theory has, after all, demonstrated how, under certain conditions, the privatisation of the social security system (or, more specifically, the comprehensive passage to funding) is, per se, neutral both for the economy and the individuals' welfare (Pestieau and Possen, 1997; Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes, 1998; Murphy and Welch, 1998 ).
These conditions are strongly restrictive, demanding, in particular, that: i) the transition (towards a fully funded system) be financed with public debt, i.e. transforming the implicit social security debt into an explicit one and rolling it over in time; ii) the rules of determination of pension rights not be modified; iii) the saving and portfolio composition choices of families not be binded by more stringent constraints than the usual intertemporal constraint; and iv) the preferences of individuals encompass the utility of future generations 25 . cases end up by being equivalent.
That these conditions are contradicted in reality is hardly questionable. First, if, as the calculations presented above show, the pension system is a source of distortion and redistribution between and within generations, in so far as it corrects such distortions and reduces redistributive flows, the passage to funding cannot be said to be neutral. It is also likely, however, that this correction could be obtained within the public system, without any need to switch to funding. Second, an intrinsic incoherence derives from the fact that the very institution of the social security PAYG system implies that the generations that "vote" it create a transfer in favour of themselves; in the presence of slow growth and adverse demographic trends 26 , this transfer is paid by losses to the disadvantage of future generations, which find themselves tied to a system which they did not contribute to choose and design. Furthermore, given the different types of risk characterising the public PAYG system (variations in rules, demographic risk, poor economic growth) and the private funded one (risks inherent in financial investment), the optimal composition of social security wealth is likely to contemplate both a public and a private component. Finally, if families have restricted access to the stock market, institutions such as pension funds, thanks to the possibility of greater diversification which they offer, may represent a net improvement in terms of the risk-return combination. If we consider that, even in the United States, fewer than 50 per cent of families possess share portfolios, the asset allocation choices of Italian households -traditionally unwilling to buy shares -is unlikely to neutralise the effect on portfolios of the compulsory contribution to a PAYG system, apparently characterised by low rates but also relatively low risks 27 . Neutrality is thus the benchmark which serves to clarify how only 'privatisation' accompanied by an (at least partial) extinction of the previous social security debt can bring about a gain in welfare for subsequent generations, naturally at the cost of a 'double burden' for the generations of the transition period.
Room exists to increase the funded component of the Italian social security system, thus enabling households to enjoy the benefits of a greater portfolio diversification. For the same reason, however, the alternative of a passage to a fully funded system must be viewed 26 Cf. Kotlikoff (1987) . 27 Of course, the question remains open as to whether this is a question of constraints (resulting from high entry costs) or of preferences, in the sense of a high risk-aversion. An analogy exists with the interpretation of as sub-optimal, even before than unfeasible (where the implicit pension debt is particularly high). In this sense, the same low differential we have adopted in simulations in favour of the interest rate over the GDP growth rate should be seen as an expression of our preference for a mixed system.
Adopting an opting out clause for the Italian case
Contracting out of social security is a hot argument in the debate on pensions reform and one for which it is quite difficult to find a general theoretical framework (perhaps because there are too many ways to implement it, and the welfare implications are heavily dependent on the conditions that characterise this partial privatisation strategy) 28 .
Opting out of national PAYG systems is in fact aimed at reducing the relative weight of the public pillar, while increasing that of the funded component; there are however some peculiarities with respect to a generic privatisation program. The main point is that the transition is based on individuals' free choice: workers are given the chance to call themselves out of the PAYG program, shifting (part of) their future payroll contributions to a private fund. At retirement, part of their benefits will then be privately provided, and part by the Government. The voluntary element may certainly be considered a good value per se, but it adds uncertainty on the final result and on the transition costs.
Supporters of opting out typically argue that: a -A private funded pillar will improve the long run sustainability of the public system because of the reduction of future liabilities; dynamic efficiency will nonetheless guarantee a non-inferior amount of the pension benefit; b -A choice based mechanism is welfare improving with respect to a mandatory one; the low indebtedness of Italian households: should this be interpreted as the effect of stringent liquidity constraints or of prudent consumer behaviour?
28 Literature on opting out is either theoretical or case-based.Recent contributions are: Disney, Whitehouse (1992 and 1993 ), Gustman, Steinmeier (1996 ), Mitchell, Zeldes (1996 , Kotlikoff, Smetters, Walliser (1998), Castellino and Fornero (1999) , Disney (1999) , Disney, Palacios, Whitehouse (1999 ), Menzio (2000 . Some of them follow a completely theoretical approach, while many are aimed at establishing a sound theoretical framework for the assessment of reform proposals or actual reforms. Case studies constitute a wide stream and follow a more descriptive approach; they are mainly centred on recent reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe. c -Individuals should not be required to divert their discretionary savings or to provide additional ones for old age consumption, and the private pillar should be funded via a reduction of contributions (and corresponding benefits) to the public system.
• Incentive analysis
The most obvious way to analyse incentives to opt out of PAYG is to look at the accrual structure of pension benefits. Within a deterministic framework the result does not take into account the portfolio composition argument, and a full shift to the funded system will be the optimal choice whenever the marginal net accrued benefit for the PAYG is negative, which means that the implicit return on the marginal contribution is lower than the risk free interest rate. This kind of analysis (Disney 1999) shows that whenever accrual structures are different for PAYG and funded plans, the individual may find optimal to spend part of the time in each of the systems, and also to switch more than once if this is allowed.
Our simulation model enables us to make these calculations; however, as we shall see, the results for Italy are somehow peculiar.
• The Italian case
The analysis -similar to that adopted by Disney, Palacios, Whitehouse (1999) for the UK -is based on the net accrued benefits.
Net accrued benefits are defined as the present value -at the beginning of working life -of the future pension flows accrued up to a certain seniority, less the present value of the contributions already paid, as shown by the following equation:
where W(S) are the net accrued benefits, S stands for "seniority", P(S) is the pension accrued at seniority S, η is the actuarial coefficient, which depends on the probability of being alive or, if dead, of one's spouse being alive (and receiving half of the benefit); R is the retirement seniority, c are contributions paid and r is the risk free interest rate. If W(S) is increasing in S, contributions paid in the marginal year are invested at an implicit rate greater than r; in the opposite case, the implicit return on marginal contributions is lower than r.
The main difference with respect to Disney et al. is that they consider a given legislative framework for opting out, that of the UK, while in Italy, at the moment, opting out is not allowed.
We abstract from uncertainty and, moreover, make the following assumptions:
i) for the contribution-based component of the pension, given a fixed retirement year, accrued benefits at a given seniority, are based on the "notional capital" accrued at the age of retirement, but taking into account contributions only up to that seniority;
ii) for the earning-based component, again given a fixed retirement year, the legal accrual rate (2 per cent) is multiplied by the effective years of contribution, while the pensionable wage is the same which would have been had the subject chosen to remain in the system for his whole working life.
This hypothesis seems strong, but it may be justified once we consider that the defined-benefit component typically ties the pension benefit to a) the years of contribution and b) to the average wage of a specific final segment of the wage profile 29 .
The certainty hypotheses refer to:
i) the market interest rate, which is the "outside option";
ii) the rate of growth of the wage bill, which is the implicit return of the notional accounts;
iii) the wage profile, which affects the implicit return of the defined benefits in the PAYG.
As already mentioned, an important implication of the certainty case is the irrelevance of the diversification argument for a mixed system: the only relevant variables are the (certain) returns, and the optimal choice is of course to switch completely to the plan offering the higher rate. Figure 7 in the appendix presents net accrued benefits, discounted at 2 per cent, as a function of seniority spent in PAYG for different cohorts. The Italian peculiarity is that, after the 1995 reform, PAYG is characterised by an actuarially fair defined contribution method. However, as we already stressed, the new rules fully apply only to new entrants, while a pro rata mechanism applies to intermediate working cohorts (the older ones being almost untouched by the reforms). In this framework, the old PAYG rules granted an implicit return above the market (risk free) interest rate; the return is however lower (given our assumptions on parameters) for the marginal contribution paid to the new PAYG. This implies that for all cohorts, with the exception of those excluded from the reform, the W(S) curve peaks in 1996. Again, this confirms that, given dynamic efficiency, a complete switch to the funded system would be the optimal choice, assuming that already accrued rights were preserved.
Of course, this clear cut result is due to the absence of any portfolio composition analysis; once risk is introduced, a good argument for a mixed choice is likely to emerge, at least on theoretical grounds; nevertheless our simulations suggest that any opting out proposal should be founded on a well focused incentive analysis, and that a limited and gradual implementation is likely to be the only feasible solution.
In this perspective, table 11 shows a rough projection of the additional costs to be sustained if new entrants in the labour market are allowed a partial rebate on their contributions to the PAYG; the simulation is performed for different rebates and considers constant flows in and out of the labour market and fixed lengths of work and retirement 30 .
Conclusions
In this paper, we looked at the Italian social security system from a perspective that is at once strictly economic (money's worth) and sharply individualistic (albeit representing individuals through the generations they belong to). This perspective is particularly suitable for a description of the future Italian PAYG system, which, in so far as it is contributory, will be centred on principles of actuarial equivalence characteristic of private insurance, only tempered by a minimum income provision.
29 For example, two per cent times 40 years gives the famous 80 per cent of the "last" wage, which was a benchmark in the pre-Amato legislation 30 The simulation is an aggregate one. Starting from the actual payroll tax rate (33 per cent), we considered the official projections (Cf. Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Bilancio dello Stato, 1996) of the equilibrium payroll tax rates and of pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP. We then calculated the new average payroll tax were the opting out introduced via a partial rebate for new entrants and obtained a projection of the social security deficit (as a percentage of GDP). The exercise is limited to private employees and considers a GDP growth rate of 1.5 per cent.
Calculations show:
i. a progressive, strong reduction in social security's worth to the detriment of younger future generations, for whom benefits will no longer be determined according to the generous rules of the past;
ii. the tax on the continuation of the working activity still present in the long transition envisaged by the 1995 Dini reform;
iii. the effects in terms of the reduction in the disparity of treatment and microeconomic distortions produced by the extensions of the pro rata mechanism, as well as the modest expenditure savings generated by this measure;
iv. the larger reduction in expenditure (and consequently in the deficits) obtainable with the introduction of an actuarial correction of seniority pensions.
We recognise that these calculations are insufficient to grasp the complexity of the 'social security question', in particular its implications in terms of welfare. However they do have the advantage of moving the debate away from its more ideological formulations and provide a more objective basis for discussion. This is not to argue that the social security system has to loose the characteristics of social cohesion that constituted the great appeal of the PAYG system; on the contrary, the reform hypotheses discussed in the paper may be interpreted as reinforcing the sustainability and equity of the system. However, we cannot avoid wondering which forces and which values can push future generations too to give up the fruits of a greater diversification of their social security portfolio and remain bound, with particularly high coefficients, to a generally inefficient system. A partial and gradual opting out clause for younger generations could be the relatively painless way to introduce greater diversification in the Italian households' pension wealth. Table 8 -extension of the pro rata mechanism -% savings on GDP (g=1.5%) % reduction in pension wealth 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 cohorts Figure 6 -implicit taxation when retirement is postponed from 35 to 40 years' seniority present legislation pro rata extension
Figure 7
Hps: constant prices 1998; g=1,5%; r=2%; start of working life: 22; real wage growth: 1,5% after 1997, historical before; seniority-wage profiles: OLS estimates from 1996 cross section. 
Introduction
The model was developed using 'Mathematica  ', in order to simulate pension flows of a representative individual identified on the basis of the age he started his job, of his seniority in 1995 and his age at retirement, assuming that his career is continuous; the software calculates also the present value of retirement benefits, taking into account survivors' pension. A specific module (limited to private employees) aggregates microeconomic values, and calculates by age the pension expenditure for individuals who reach retirement year by year.
The structure of the program
The program is based on four modules: 1) 'data', whose function is to contain and prepare (for example by adding inflation or by running regressions) the data for the simulations;
2) 'calculation': which defines the procedures for simulating pensions flows and for calculating present values;
3) 'aggregation': which defines the procedures for the aggregate estimates; 4) 'simulation': which provides results by activating the previous modules on the basis of specific requests.
The 'data' module
It contains data on GDP growth, inflation, actuarial transformation and revaluation coefficients envisaged by the legislation, male and female survival tables updated to 1994 and historical and present payroll tax rates. The parameters and the variables of the model are illustrated in table 1. η e actuarial coefficient relative to age "e" for the calculation of present value of pension benefits, taking into account survivors' pension
The individual wage profile is derived from an interpolation of average wages (workers and clerks) by age on a 1996 INPS cross-section; values (at 1998 prices) are then updated year by year for the average variation (historical for the past or hypothesised for the future) of the real wage. As figure 1 shows, the individuals' wage thus varies both on account of the variation in productivity (shift of the cross-section), and of longer seniority (movement along the crosssectional curve).
The cross-section data show a decreasing trend in wages after the age of 50. This trend is not typical of individual data, but is an aggregation effect: at advanced ages a higher fraction of low-wage individuals stays in the job world. This effect was neutralised by replacing the interpolator with a relatively weak upward linear trend 31 in the age group concerned. 
The 'calculation' module
The module determines, according to existing legislation, the pension of individuals who had fewer than 18 years' seniority in 1995, that of individuals who had reached or exceeded said seniority in 1995, the pension deriving from the extension to these latter of the pro rata mechanism, the present value of contributions and pension services (taking survivors' into account) of a parametrically-defined individual and the PAYG internal rate of return for the same individual.
a) The pension of individuals who had at least 18 years' seniority at December 31 1995 is determined according to the following formula: 
The 'simulation' module
The 'simulation' module activates the procedures of previous modules on the basis of a specific request referable to any magnitude that the program is able to calculate. In order to make the calculation, the module requires a set of input parameters: a) age of entry into the job world, b) seniority at 31.12.1995, c) seniority at retirement d) discount rate for present values, e) hypothesis on the annual variations of the real wage and GDP for the years subsequent to 1997.
Parameters above may be supplied as point values, or else the result can be tabulated for a set of parameter values. 32 As we have already pointed out, careers are assumed to be continuous, and no one dies before reaching pension requirements. 33 And for a number of years sufficient to exhaust the flow of pensions paid to individuals who were registered on the FPLD in 1995.
